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THE NEED FOR A COURT OF TAX APPEALS:
AN ARGUMENT AND A STUDY*
Louis A. DEL COTTO**
If we were seeking to secure a state of complete uncertainty in taxjurisprudence, we could hardly do better than to provide for 87 Courts
with original jurisdiction, 11 appellate bodies of co-ordinate rank, and
only a discretionary review of very few cases by the Supreme Court.1
It is time to mitigate the uncertainty. Our system of judicial review
should be modified so that the Supreme Court no longer need pass on tax
issues merely to resolve conflicts among the circuit courts of appeals. 2
This proposition is controversial. The controversy stems from proposals
made by R. J. Traynor and Stanley Surrey, more than two decades ago, for
sweeping changes in federal tax administration and judicial review of tax
disputes. 3 In 1944, Erwin N. Griswold expanded upon the need for change
in the area of judicial review.4 These writers pointed out that the present
system of appellate review breeds litigation and requires an inordinate amount
of time to settle issues. The alleged central defect in this system is the possibility
of conflicting decisions on similar issues in the circuit courts of appeals. As a
solution there was proposed a single intermediate appellate court, a Court of
Tax Appeals, which would take over the entire jurisdiction of the circuit courts,
and of the Supreme Court in Court of Claims cases, for civil tax appeals. 5
* This paper is a revision of the submission in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Laws in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University. Italics in
footnotes are omitted.
** Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo, University
of Buffalo School of Law; Assistant Counsel, New York State Temporary Commission on
Estates; LL.B., University of Buffalo, 1951; LL.M., Columbia University, 1961; Member of
the New York Bar; former partner, Jaeckle, Fleischmann, Kelly, Swart and Augspurger,
Buffalo, New York.
1. Magill, The Impact of Federal Income Taxes 209 (1943).
2. The issue of whether the Supreme Court is or is not the best arbiter of tax issues
will not be discussed. That a Supreme Court decision is not the best solution to a tax
issue is persuasively demonstrated in Lowndes. Federal Taxation and the Supreme Court,
1960 The Supreme Court Review 222. In all events, this should not be the issue. The
point is, at least as to tax cases where rapid certainty is so vital and the consequences of
lack of it so far-reaching, one level of review may be good enough and also all we can
afford. See Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1153,
1190-91 (1944).
3. Traynor, Administrative and judicial Procedure for Federal Income Estate and
Gift Taxes-A Criticism and a Proposal, 38 Colum. L. Rev. 1393 (1938); Traynor and
Surrey, New Roads Toward the Settlement of Federal Income, Estate and Gift Tax
Controversies, 7 Law & Contemp. Prob. 336 (1940).
4. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1153 (1944).
This view was recently reiterated. Griswold, Forward, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74
Harv. L. Rev. 81, 85 (1960). Other distinguished scholars have recently argued for such a
court. Lowndes, Federal Taxation and The Supreme Court, 1960 The Supreme Court
Review 222, 223; Brown, The Growing "Common Law" of Taxation, 13 U. So. Cal. 1961
Tax Inst. 1, 26.
5. The problem will be considered only in terms of civil tax appeals. Criminal tax
cases are not only generally more concerned with criminal law than tax law, but there is
little possibility of conflict in the applicable rules. Moreover, since the passage of the
Sixteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has decided by opinion only 22 criminal cases
involving tax evasion. Lowndes, supra note 2, at 223, 224.
5
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Since Traynor and Surrey wrote, the only significant changes in tax ad-
ministration have occurred within the Internal Revenue Service, culminating
with a major administrative reorganization in 1952. 6 The Tax Court, until
1942 known as the Board of Tax Appeals (and technically not a court but an
independent agency in the Executive Branch of the Government), has had
no substantial changes in its operative procedure since 1926, two years after
it was established. No change at all has occurred in the system of appellate
review of tax cases. The problems inherent in the system twenty years ago
remain with us.
The Internal Revenue Service has the initial responsibility for collecting
,taxes and enforcing revenue laws. But it can ultimately dispose of tax contro-
versies only through rules made by the courts. Necessity therefore demands
that such rules be made rapidly and with a high degree of finality. If the
Supreme Court reviewed only cases involving issues of public importance,
denial of certiorari from a court of appeals decision no doubt would end the
matter and accomplish this result. This is not, however, the case. The court
of appeals of a different circuit may subsequently pass on the same issue and
hold the opposite. Although the Supreme Court will hear relatively few tax
cases because of public importance of the issues involved, it will grant certiorari
to resolve conflicts between the circuits and promote uniformity of decision.
Thus, the presence of co-ordinate courts for tax appeals works the magic that
requires the Supreme Court to become the final arbiter of tax issues that the
Court would not otherwise decide.
The consequences are numerous; they are pronounced and undesirable.
First, as to potentially every tax issue the Supreme Court has not passed upon,
there is no settled guiding rule upon which disputes between the Commissioner
and the taxpayer can be resolved. In the face of uncertainty, the Commissioner
must protect the revenue and so takes a position favorable to the government,
often despite contrary court decisions. The taxpayer likewise resolves doubts in
his own favor. Injustice is an inevitable consequence. If the Commissioner is
eventually proved wrong, many taxpayers will have paid unjust taxes, or
at least have been forced to expense and trouble in defending their positions.
If the Commissioner ultimately prevails in the Supreme Court, the revenue
will have suffered by intervening taxpayer victories. Moreover, under our
self-assfessment system, it is impossible to know the extent to which the revenue
suffers because unaudited returns may be based upon positions ultimately
proved wrong. Equality among taxpayers thus becomes largely a fortuitous
matter, depending upon the development and resolution of a conflict. Mean-
while, our revenue raising system is unfair all around; to the public in imposing
a disproportionate tax burden on some to the advantage of others, and to the
government.
A recent case provides a graphic example of the strange ways of justice
6. Surrey and Warren, Federal Income Taxation 19, 43 (5th ed. 1960).
6
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under this system. The Ohio Power Co. filed suit in the Court of Claims to
recover an alleged overpayment of taxes, asserting it was entitled under the
statute to accelerated amortization of the full cost of wartime facilities it had
constructed, and not merely of that part of the cost which the War Production
Board had certified as necessary in the interest of national defense. The Court
of Claims sustained the taxpayer's position.7 The Supreme Court denied the
government's petition for certiorari8 and its petition for rehearing.9
And so the matter would seem to have ended. But in the meantime, back
in the lower courts, the magic conflict was brewing. The National Lead Co. had
also just beaten the Commissioner in the Tax Court on the exact same issue' °
and that case was before the Second Circuit. The Allen-Bradley Co. had an
identical case and, with a choice between the Tax Court and the Court of
Claims for sure victory, instituted suit in the latter. The government would
appear to have had no business opposing the Allen-Bradley Co. claim in
view of the Court of Claims decision in the Ohio Power Co. case and denial
of certiorari therein by the Supreme Court. But the government had its money
on National Lead in the Second Circuit, and it won." Shortly thereafter, when
Allen-Bradley Co. was decided for the taxpayer,' 2 certiorari was granted by
the Supreme Court to resolve the conflict.13 The government ultimately pre-
vailed.1
4
The above picture is not extraordinary. It merely illustrates the uneven
justice which is commonplace under our system of appellate review. Of three
identically situated taxpayers, two had paid taxes and one had not. The
different results were entirely due to the intervention of the magic conflict.
The story, however, continues. In Ohio Power Co., the government, when its
petition for rehearing on certiorari was denied, seemed to have failed in its
efforts to keep the case open until the Second Circuit decided National Lead Co.
There appeared to be no doubt of failure when the Supreme Court, refusing
for the third time to take the case, denied leave to file a second petition
for rehearing.' 5 Nevertheless, two weeks after this denial, incident to its
grants of certiorari in Allen-Bradley Co. and National Lead Co., the Court,
in violation of its own rules regarding timely and consecutive petitions for
rehearing, vacated sua sponte its denial of the first petition for rehearing and,
7. Ohio Power Co. v. United States, 131 Ct. C1. 95 (March 1, 1955).
8. 350 U.S. 862 (October 17, 1955).
9. 350 U.S. 919 (December 5, 1955). After denial of petition for rehearing, the court
invariably considers a case dosed and will automatically deny further such petitions. See
United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98, 99-111 (1957).
10. National Lead Co., 23 T.C. 998 (March 14, 1955).
11, Commissioner v. National Lead Co., 230 F.2d 161 (Feb. 14, 1956).
12. Allen-Bradley Co. v. United States, 134 Ct. CI. 800 (April 3, 1956).
13. 351 U.S. 981 (June 11, 1956).
14. United States v. Allen-Bradley Co., 352 U.S. 306 (1957); National Lead Co. v.
Commissioner, 352 U.S. 313 (1957).
15. 351 U.S. 958 (May 28, 1956).
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two months after deciding the other cases, granted the petition for certiorari
and reversed the Court of Claims.'"
Thus, in the interest of "uniformity in the application of the princi-
ples . . . "17 set forth in Allen-Bradley Co. and National Lead Co., the Court
sacrificed the principle of finality of adjudication so clearly embodied in its
rules and past decisions.' 8 Perhaps this price was worth paying in order to
prevent a fortuitous conflict from causing uneven justice. Ultimately, however,
uniformity of decision cannot depend upon re-opening of all the old litigation,
the result of which is at odds with a conflict-produced decision of the Supreme
Court. Conflict-developing periods are generally too long for that.
Ohio Power Co. also demonstrates the second pronounced and discernable
consequence of co-ordinate appellate courts, increase of the administrative
burden and breeding of litigation. To resolve a single issue, three cases went
through the entire administrative and judicial spectrum. Moreover each of the
cases required more than nine years from the tax year to reach the trial stage,
and more than three additional years to be disposed of. The clear result is
greater expense to both the taxpayer and the government, greater resort
to already overburdened courts, and increasing taxpayer dissatisfaction.
The third consequence, closely related to the second, arises from the
attitude of the Tax Court in refusing to be bound by court of appeals prec-
edents, even where appeal would lie to the circuit creating the precedent.10
This attitude creates an obvious problem. Many a taxpayer may be forced to
make merely a formal stop in the Tax Court on his way to the Court of
Appeals, again resulting in wasteful, expensive activity for the courts, the
government and the taxpayer.
The problem arises from the peculiar position of the Tax Court in the
administration of revenue laws. It has nation-wide jurisdiction in cases in-
volving a disputed determination of a deficiency by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, jurisdiction over refund cases being in the federal district
courts and the Court of Claims.2° Technically, the Tax Court is an agency in
the Executive Branch of the Government,2 ' but it is commonly recognized as a
court.2 2 There can be no question that the Tax Court exercises essentially
judicial rather than administrative functions. It decides individual cases be-
tween particular litigants on the basis of specific facts and by application of
a highly detailed statute. It has neither broad policy making power, nor the
16. United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98 (1957).
17. Ibid.
18. Id. at 99-111.
19. See Comment Heresy in the Hierarchy: Tax Court Rejection of Court of Ap-
peals Precedents, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 717 (1957); Note, Tax Court Must Follow Decisions
of Court of Appeals With Appellate jurisdiction Over Case at Bar, 70 Harv. L, Rev. 1313
(1957).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1) (1958).
21. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7441.
22. See Comment, Heresy in the Hierarchy: Tax Court Rejection of Courts of Ap-
peals Precedents, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 717 (1957).
NEED FOR COURT OF TAX APPEALS
deliberately vague legislative mandate given to administrative agencies,23
and the courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to review its decisions
"in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts
in civil actions tried without a jury."24 Thus, the Tax Court is, in effect, a
national trial court at the apex of an inverted pyramid with appeals fanning
out to eleven different courts of appeals.
A federal district court in a circuit where the Court of Appeals has decided
a particular issue is bound to follow it. The Tax Court does not feel bound
by the decision of a court of appeals. This freedom of choice25 presents problems
where the opinion of the Tax Court on an issue is at odds with that of a court
of appeals, or where various courts of appeals have decided the issue in a
conflicting manner.26 The greatest difficulty is presented where the Tax Court,
on the issue before it, disagrees with a decision on the same issue by the circuit
court to which an appeal would lie. This has happened quite a few times over
the past ten years, and the reviewing court has always reversed, 27 often de-
livering the Tax Court a scathing lecture.
28
Why does the Tax Court not only open itself to severe criticism, but also
make itself a mere stopping point on the way to eventual reversal on review?
It would seem easier to follow the logic of the Sixth Circuit which reminded
the Tax Court that though it had national jurisdiction, it was in no way superior
to the federal district courts and was "not lawfully privileged to disregard and
refuse to follow, as the settled law of the circuit, an opinion of the court
of appeals for that circuit."29
The Tax Court has itself ably presented its reasons 30 and they have
been sufficiently discussed elsewhere. 31 Suffice it to say here that at the core
of the Tax Court's position is its national jurisdiction. This requires it, says
the Court, to "follow its own honest beliefs until the Supreme Court decides
23. Id. at 717, 718.
24. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7482(a).
25. We shall see there is great dispute as to the extent of the freedom.
26. The Tax Court discusses its views on these situations in Lawrence, 21 T.C. 713
(1957), rev'd, Lawrence v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1958).
27. Lawrence, 27 T.C. 713 (1957), rev'd, Lawrence v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 562
(9th Cir. 1958); The Stacey Manufacturing Co., 24 T.C. 703 (1955) and Richmond Hosiery
Mills, T.C. Memo. 1955-214, 14 CCH T.C. Memo. Dec. 847 (1955), rev'd, The Stacey
Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1956); Sullivan, T.C. Memo.
1956-5, 1956 P-H T.C. Memo. Dec. 56005 (1956), rev'd, Sullivan v. Commissioner, 241
F.2d 46 (7th Cir. 1957); Stern, T.C. Memo. 1956-23, 1956 P-H T.C. Memo. Dec. 56,023
(1956), rev'd, Stern v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1957); Houston Farms
Development Co. v. Commissioner, 194 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1952).
28. The Stacey Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1956),
Stern v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1957), Sullivan v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d
46 (7th Cir. 1957).
29. The Stacey Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 605, 606 (6th Cir. 1956).
30. Lawrence, 27 T.C. 713, 716-20 (1957), rev'd, 258 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1958).
31. Comment, Heresy in the Hierarchy: Tax Court Rejection of Courts of Appeals
Precedent, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 717 (1957), Note, Tax Court Must Follow Decisions of
Courts of Appeals With Appellate jurisdiction Over Case At Bar, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1313(1957).
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the point."'32 However, the Tax Court itself notes that other national trial
courts, the United States Customs Court and the Court of Claims, do not
have its problems because appeals in the case of each of these courts go to an
appellate court which also has nation-wide jurisdiction.3 3 The problem is
present not because the Tax Court is a court of national jurisdiction, but be-
cause it is reviewed by eleven different appellate courts.
Persuasive arguments have been advanced that the Tax Court can, and
should, abandon its present position and, with respect to each taxpayer before
it, decide like a federal district court.34 But the Tax Court gives no indication
of a change of heart. Apparently it does not wish to be put into the position
of, for example, deciding an issue differently for each of two partners whose
appeals would lie to conflicting circuit courts.3 5 It is not surprising that a
single court does not wish to be recorded as being on all possible sides of
the same question, especially at the same time. One could hardly blame the
Tax Court if it were passing the buck to the courts of appeals in order not to
be victimized by the ridiculous necessities of the system of appellate review.
But the buck is really being passed to the litigants due to the lack of a single
appellate court of national jurisdiction.
A similar problem which stems from the trial level but has repercussions
throughout the appellate system is due to the Court of Claims. This is another
trial court of national jurisdiction (in refund cases) which, since it is reviewable
only by the Supreme Court on certiorari, need not follow any decision of the
courts of appeals. It therefore has a twofold character: that of a trial court
and that of federal court of appeals. Thus, its decisions too will be reviewed
by the Supreme Court when in conflict with a decision of the circuit courts.3 0
Besides encouraging forum-shopping, the Court of Claims thus adds to the
burden of the Supreme Court. This additional burden would be removed by a
single court of tax appeals with jurisdiction to review Court of Claims tax
decisions.
This picture is bleak enough. However, there is a fourth factor which
gives it its worst dimension: the amount of time during which an issue is
open. As to every issue, the longer it remains unsettled, the more opportunities
arise for injustice, expense and litigation. And, potentially, an issue will remain
open until a conflict arises in the circuit courts of appeals and is resolved by the
Supreme Court.
Cannot such a system be improved? To Griswold, the answer is clearly
32. Lawrence, 27 T.C. 713, 716-17 (1957), rev'd, 258 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1958).
33. Id. at 717.
34. See note 22 supra.
35. See Lawrence, 27 T.C. 713, 719 (1957), rev'd, 258 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1958).
36. In the five terms studied, the following cases, decided by the Supreme Court
because of conflicts between the Court of Claims and the courts of appeals, originated in
the Court of Claims: United States v. Anderson Clayton & Co., 350 U.S. 55 (1955);
United States v. Huntington Beach Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956); United States v. Allen-
Bradley Co., 352 U.S. 306 (1957); United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98 (1957).
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Yes! His article on the need for a court of tax appeals presents a tightly
reasoned argument supporting this position. This article has been attacked on
many grounds, most of which Griswold anticipated because of similar objections
to the Traynor-Surrey plan. Probably the most significant opposition to Gris-
wold's thesis arose out of Remmlein's time study of tax litigation for the years
1939-47. 37 An important conclusion of this study is that the median interval
between conflicting court decisions is two years with extremely slow-developing
conflicts being rare.38 From this, Remmlein concludes that such conflicts are
not an obstacle to speedy settlement of tax issues.39 However, in view of the
widespread impact of taxes, and the high rates of taxation, is not even two
years too long a time for issues to remain open?40 Is there not excessive, needless
litigation and grave injustice during this period? And consider also that this
two year period does not include the time taken by the Supreme Court to
resolve the conflict. Moreover, in the last four years of Remmlein's study,
conflicts took a median time of 132 to 42 years to develop. This is substan-
tially more than the eight months to a year and one-half for the prior four
years. Is there any trend developing in this respect?
There follows a report based upon a study of the need for a single court
of tax appeals. Civil tax cases decided by the Supreme Court in the five terms
1955 through 1959 have been studied along the following lines of inquiry:
1. What proportion and number of the total civil tax cases are conflict and
non-conflict cases?
2. What is the time necessary finally to determine civil tax cases, from the
end of the tax year to ultimate disposition?
3. Is there any significant difference in this time for conflict or non-
conflict cases?
4. What portion of this time is consumed at each level of decision, the
Supreme Court, the circuit courts of appeals, the trial courts, and the ad-
ministrative process?
5. Is there any significant difference at these various levels in the time
needed to decide conflict and non-conflict cases?
6. How long do issues remain unsettled due to the presence of 11 ap-
37. Remmlein, Tax Controversies-Where Goes the Time?, 13 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
416 (1945), A Time Study of Certain Tax Controversies, 16 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 238 (1948).
38. Remmlein, supra, 16 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 245, 246 (1948).
39. Remmlein, supra, 13 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 431 (1945); 16 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 250,
251 (1948). Remmlein's study was used as a springboard by the most outspoken foe of a
Court of Tax Appeals: Robert N. Miller, Can Tax Appeals Be Centralized?, 23 Taxes 303
(1945); A Specialized Court of Tax Appeals?, 40 A.B.A.J. 563 (1954).
40. In a speech to the Cornell Law Association on May 9, 1959 P-H 5 32, 255 (1959),
Assistant Attorney General Charles K. Rice said: "Truly, federal tax litigation has come of
age and must be considered as one of the largest and most important single blocks of liti-
gation involving the Federal Government. The importance of this litigation cannot be
measured alone in terms of the number of cases or dollar amounts involved. The precedent
importance of many of the decisions controls the ultimate disposition of untold billions in
the ordinary processes of revenue collection ......
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pellate courts of co-ordinate rank-i.e., what is the period of time an issue
remains unsettled after it is first decided by a circuit court of appeals?
7. Is there any relationship between the speed with which a conflict
develops and is ultimately resolved, and the complexity of the issue involved or
its importance in tax administration?
8. Would the burden of the courts and the Internal Revenue Service
be significantly reduced if the possibility of tax conflicts was removed?
9. Could a single court of tax appeals manage the entire appellate civil
tax case load?
10. What would be the effect on the appellate caseload of the circuit
courts of appeals if they lost jurisdiction over civil tax appeals?
Precise answers to all these questions could not be found. The data re-
vealed by the study, nevertheless, provides a fairly clear idea of the impact that
our system of appellate review has upon the courts, the administrative process,
and the taxpayer. A current perspective is provided from which to evaluate
the need and desirability of a single court of tax appeals.
METHOD OF THE STUDY
Study was made of the federal civil tax cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court for the five terms beginning October, 1955. During this period
the Court decided a total of 74 such cases in 49 opinions. Certain adjustments
were made in order more accurately to determine the total impact of these
cases, and the relative impact of conflict and non-conflict cases, upon the
administrative and judicial machinery. Thus, allowance was made for cases
decided in the Supreme Court by memorandum, per curiam opinions and with-
out argument. These undoubtedly made far less demand upon the Court's
time than cases decided by full opinion after argument. Adjustments for
the memorandum cases are reflected in the time spent by the Court in dis-
posing of tax cases and the relative number of conflict and non-conflict cases
decided. Because of the relatively small number of memorandum opinions, the
results are not significantly different.41 At the levels below the Supreme Court-
the circuit courts of appeals, the trial courts, and the administrative-each
of the memorandum cases decided by these opinions was counted as one,
except for three at the court of appeals level.42
41. There were only eight cases decided in five memorandum, per curiam opinions.
Five of these were conflict cases, but since they were disposed of in two opinions on the
authority of full opinion cases decided the same term, they are counted as only two cases
decided in two opinions. See United States v. Hine Pontiac et al., 360 U.S. 715 (1959),
United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp. et al., 360 U.S. 716 (1959), granting the petition
for writ of certiorari and simultaneously reversing the Courts of Appeals on the authority
of Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (1959), Commissioner v. Glover, 360 U.S.
446 (1959), and Baird v. Commissioner, 360 U.S. 446 (1959).
42. United States v Hine Pontiac, 2 AFTR 2d 5694 (5th Cir. 1958), not otherwise
reported, rev'd, 360 U.S. 715 (1960), Modem Olds Inc. v. United States, 2 AFTR 2d 5713
(5th Cir. 1958), not otherwise reported, rev'd, 360 U.S. 715 (1959), Commissioner v.
Kilborn, 2 AFTR 2d 5812 (5th Cir. 1959), not otherwise reported, rev'd, 360 U.S. 715
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Another, and more important, adjustment resulted from consolidation
of cases, either in the Supreme Court or below.
In studying action by the Court, all cases having individual docket num-
bers were counted as one, although sometimes two (and in one instance three)
separate dockets were decided in a single opinion. Analysis of these dockets
indicates that their effect upon the Court's load was not significantly reduced
by this procedure. The facts involved were generally different and separately
stated in the opinions, 43 and, with one exception, the dockets apparently
were not consolidated for argument.44 This treatment seems especially appro-
priate where a single opinion decided dockets reviewed because of a conflict
between the circuits. 45 The recognized presence of the conflict is an additional
factor indicating equal attention being given to each docket.
Not only were multiple dockets disposed of in a single opinion, but often
a single docket would contain more than one case. Each of these dockets was
nevertheless counted only as one case. The suits involved were consolidated
either in the Supreme Court or below, the fact situations involved in each
docket were identical or substantially the same, and the opinions of the Court
indicate each of these dockets was no more demanding than if composed of a
single case.46 However, in studying action below the Supreme Court level,
most of these cases were each counted as one. Multiple cases were treated as
one in the relatively few instances where they obviously proceeded to dis-
position with little more impact than a single case.
47
(1959). These cases were disposed of in the Court of Appeals on stipulation, without
briefing or argument.
43. See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) and F. Strauss & Sons Inc.
v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 498 (1959); Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215 (1959) and Huss v.
Smith, 359 U.S. 215 (1959).
44. See note 45, post.
45. See United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960) and Bank of America National
Trust and Savings Association v. United States, 363 U.S. 237 (1960); Commissioner v.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960) and Stanton v. United States, 363 U.S. 278 (1960);
Massey Motors Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92 (1960) and Commissioner v. Evans, 364
U.S. 92 (1960); Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (1959), Commissioner v. Glover,
360 U.S. 446 (1959) and Baird v. Commissioner, 360 U.S. 446 (1959); Commissioner v.
Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956) and United States v. Huntington Beach Co.,
350 U.S. 308 (1956). Of all dockets not decided in a separate opinion, Hansen and Glover
were the only ones apparently consolidated for argument. The Court, however, went to
great pains in the opinion to separately state the facts in each case at great length.
46. E.g., Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215 (1959) and Huss v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215
(1959) each involved questions arising out of partnership activity. The two dockets were
each composed of the cases of three partners with identical factual and legal issues. See
also Puerifoy v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59 (1958) (three cases), Commissioner v. Sullivan,
356 U.S. 27 (1958) (three cases), Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958)
(seven cases). Two memorandum, per curiam opinions also disposed of multiple cases.
United States v. Hine Pontiac, 360 U.S. 715 (1959) (three cases), United States v. Colonial
Chevrolet Corp., 360 U.S. 716 (1959) (two cases).
47. E.g., Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215 (1959) and Huss v. Smith 359 U.S. 215
(1959), discussed supra note 46, were each treated as one starting with the administrative
level though each involved three cases. These cases were consolidated in the trial court.
See Parsons v. Smith, 52 AFTR 1661 (D.C.E.D. Pa. 1957), not otherwise reported, and
Huss v. Smith, 150 F. Supp. 224 (D.C.E.D. Pa. 1957). The same treatment was given the
following cases, all of which were consolidated with others in the trial court: Puerifoy v.
Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59 (1958) (three cases), Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27
13
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The above is a broad picture of the methods used in making the study.
Greater detail will be presented in discussion of the results of the study where
it will be more appropriate and better assimilated.
CivrL TAX CASES DECIDED BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT IN THE TERMS 1955-59
Action in the Supreme Court
Under the method described above, in the five terms beginning October
1955, the Supreme Court decided 57 federal civil tax cases in 49 opinions. Five
of these cases were disposed of in the same number of memorandum, per
curiam opinions. The full opinions numbered 44, disposing of 52 cases.
The cases decided have been broken down into two catagories: those
reviewed by the Supreme Court because of a conflict in the decisions of the
circuit courts of appeals, and those reviewed for some other reason. The con-
flict cases total 35 out of 57 and were decided in 29 opinions, two of them
being memorandum opinions. In 20 of these cases it was clear that the purpose
of review was to resolve a conflict between the circuits. Five of them directly
indicated no reason for the grant of certiorari and have been assigned to the
conflict category because of extrinsic evidence or language of the Court in-
directly indicating presence of a conflict. 48 Ten others were reviewed for
both the presence of a conflict and importance of the issues involved to ad-
ministration of the revenue laws.40 These cases are assigned to the conflict
category. 0
(1958) (which embraced three cases in the Supreme Court but only two below, Mesi, 25
T.C. 513 (1955), rev'd, Mesi v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1957) having received
individual treatment below), Fleming v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 260 (1958) (three cases).
48. The five cases are Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960), United States v.
Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522 (1960), Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958),
United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958), and United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 350 U.S.
383 (1956). Aquilino and Durham Lumber Co. are being treated as in conflict with one
another since they conflicted in deciding the exact same issue, the effect of state law in
determining whether a taxpayer has property to which a federal tax lien can attach. This
treatment furthermore seems warranted since certiorari was granted on the same day for
both cases, they were argued only a few days apart, and they were decided the same day.
No doubt, presence of a conflict was not mentioned as the reason for review because
Aquilino came out of the New York Court of Appeals and not a federal circuit court. In
Stern the Court indicated that the courts of appeals and the Tax Court were in conflict
on the issue involved (357 U.S. 39 (1958)) and a reading of the pertinent cases in the
courts of appeals reveals a definite conflict. Bess is a companion case to Stern and part
of the same conflict group. In Leslie Salt Co. the Court stated it was reviewing "to resolve
the uncertainty left by lower court decisions," citing circuit court decisions apparently in
conflict with one another. 350 U.S. 383, 385-86 (1956). See also Anno. 100 L. Ed. 452,
458-63 (1956).
49. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960), Stanton v. United States, 363
U.S. 278 (1960), United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960), Bank of America National
Trust and Savings Association v. United States, 363 U.S. 237 (1960), Colony Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (1959), Commissioner
v. Glover, 360 U.S. 446 (1959), Baird v. Commissioner, 360 U.S. 446 (1959), United
Stated v. Hine Pontiac, 360 U.S. 715 (1959), United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp.,
360 U.S. 716 (1959).
50. This seems proper in view of the standard practice of the Court in reviewing
when it recognizes a conflict. Furthermore, comparison with the Remmlein study will be
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The non-conflict cases total 22 out of 57 and were decided in 20 opinions,
three of them being memorandum opinions. Five of these cases specifically
stated importance of the issues involved as the sole reason for review.51 One
case was appealed directly from a federal district court on a constitutional
issue52 and three cases were reviewed because lower courts were having dif-
ficulty in applying precedents of the Supreme Court. 53 In the remaining 13
cases, neither importance nor conflict was stated as a ground for review.54
Since there appeared to be no conflict on the issues involved in the circuit
courts of appeals, these cases have been assigned to the non-conflict category
as reviewed for importance of those issues.
The conflict cases studied comprised 61.4 percent of all cases studied
and they were decided in 59.7 percent of all opinions. Disregarding the cases
decided by memorandum opinion, the conflict cases were 63.4 percent of all
cases and were decided in 61.3 percent of the opinions. These percentages are
comparable to the 65.3 percent found by Remmlein for the eight terms, October
1939 to July 1947.
55
During the five terms studied, the Court decided 637 cases in 544 full
opinions.50 The full tax opinions comprised eight percent of all full opinions
and the tax cases decided by full opinion were eight percent of all such cases.
These percentages do not, on their face, appear extraordinary. However, they
assume greater significance when viewed against a breakdown of the total
full opinion output of the Court. For example, opinions deciding labor law
questions, one of the largest areas of Supreme Court review, comprised only 9.7
percent of the full opinions for these five terms.57 And civil tax cases are almost
facilitated as she used the same technique. See Remmlein, Tax Controversies-Where Goes
the Time?, 13 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 416, 419 n.11 (1945).
51. United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299 (1960), United States v. Cannelton Sewer
Pipe Co., 364 U.S. 76 (1960), Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), F. Strauss
& Son Inc. v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) and Commissioner v. P. G. Lake Inc.,
356 U.S. 260 (1958).
52. United States v. Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit, 363 U.S. 194 (1960).
53. Puerifoy v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59 (1958), Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215
(1959) and Huss v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215 (1959).
54. Cory Corp. v. Sauber, 363 U.S. 709 (1960), Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108
(1959), United States v. R. F. Ball Construction Co., Inc., 355 U.S. 587 (1958), Com-
missioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958), Tank Truck Rentals Inc. v. Commissioner, 356
U.S. 30 (1958), Hoover Motor Express Co., Inc. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958),
Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957), Libson Shops Inc.
v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957), Commissioner v. Lo Bue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956), United
States v. Hulley, 358 U.S. 66 (1958), United States v. Vorreiter, 355 U.S. 15 (1957),
United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., Inc., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956), and Murdock
Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 350 U.S. 488 (1956).
55. A Time Study of Certain Tax Controversies, 16 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 238, 241
(1947).
56. The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 98, 99, 102, 104 (1960);
The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 129, 130, 132 (1959); The Supreme
Court, 1957 Term, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 77, 99, 100, 102 (1958); The Supreme Court, 1956
Term, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 82, 97-102 (1957); The Supreme Court, 1955 Term, 70 Harv. L.
Rev. 83, 99-101 (1956).
57. See citations note 56, supra. Included are opinions reviewing action of the
National Labor Relations Board, the most reviewed of all administrative agencies, and
questions arising under the Labor Management Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act.
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equally burdensome.5 8
Civil tax cases also seem to take an inordinate amount of time to proceed
to disposition by the Court, especially those reviewed because of a conflict
among the circuits. In all the cases studied, the median time from the tax
year59 to final disposition by the Court was eight years, four months and
19 days. Eighteen cases required more than 10 years to reach final settlement,
one taking over 17 years,60 and another over 16 years.01 Ten of the cases
required between 12 and 15 years to wind their way to final settlement. Only
three cases were disposed of within five years. 62 The typical case required
about a year longer to reach final disposition than did the typical case in
Remmlein's study. 3
The conflict cases, on the whole, took more time to proceed to settlement
than the others, a median time of eight years, 10 months and 13 days. Thirteen
of the eighteen cases with intervals of more than 10 years were in this group,
including those taking more than 17 and 16 years respectively. The non-conflict
cases were settled in a median time of seven years, eight months, 17 days.
A clear picture emerges. Civil tax cases take a long time to settle and those
reviewed by the Court because of conflict take significantly longer to settle
than the others--over one year longer. This is a reversal of the trend found by
Remmlein. In her study, the median conflict case required 7.6 years for settle-
ment, the median non-conflict case requiring 8.25 years. 4 Thus for the non-
conflict cases the median time has gone down slightly, while for the conflict
cases it has risen substantially.
Very little of the above time was used at the Supreme Court level. Nine
58. It is not the purpose here to argue that the Supreme Court is overburdened, but
merely to point out a beneficial side effect of adopting a Court of Tax Appeals. The
current dispute as to the case-load burden of the Supreme Court is reflected in: Douglas,
The Supreme Court and Its Case Load. 45 Cornell L.Q. 401 (1960): Griswold, Foreword,
The Supreme Court 1959 Term, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 81 (1960); Hart, Foreword, The
Supreme Court 1958 Term, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84 (1959); Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology,
73 Harv. L. Rev. 1298 (1960).
59. Although the tax year is not the year when taxes are generally due, it was thought
appropriate to use it as a starting point for measurement because of the desirability of
having the law clear at the time a transaction occurs so a taxpayer can better plan his
affairs, and to facilitate comparison with a prior study by Remmlein. Remmlein, Tax
Controversies-Where Goes the Time?, 13 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 416, 420 nn.12 and 13
(1945). The time is computed from January 1 of the year following the tax year, except
in estate tax cases where the date of death is used, and for fiscal year taxpayers where the
first day following the end of the fiscal year is used.
60. Stanton v. United States, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
61. Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956),
62. Puerifoy v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59 (1958) (4 years, 10 months, 10 days),
New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Scanlon, 362 U.S. 404 (1960) (two years, three months,
25 days) and United States v. Vorreiter, 355 U.S. 15 (1957) (three years, nine months,
14 days). The latter two cases are two of the three studied for which the tax year could
not be ascertained. Therefore, there was used the filing date of the Government's notice
of levy. No doubt this somewhat explains their rapid completion.
63. A Time Study of Certain Tax Controversies, 16 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 238, 240
(1947).
64. Ibid.
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months and six days were needed to dispose of the typical (median) case.
After the petition for the writ of certiorari was filed, the median time for grant-
ing it was one month, 25 days. From the grant of certiorari to the argument
date there elapsed a median time of five months, 19 days,6 5 and after argument,
decision was reached in 52 days.66
Although the time used by the Court does not appear very long, it has
increased substantially since the years studied by Remmlein. There, a median
time of nine months, 12 days was found between the decision of the circuit
court and that of the Supreme Court.67 Remmlein does not indicate the time
used in applying for certiorari. Allowing 90 days68 for this purpose, the total
decision time allocable to the Court is about six months, 12 days. This is almost
three months less time than was used in the five terms embraced by this study.
Breaking this difference down, it took the Court 24 days longer to decide the
median case after argument (an increase of almost 100 percent), and two
months, 16 days longer to reach argument after certiorari was granted (an in-
crease of over 80 percent). 9
Also unlike the earlier study, 0 significant differences in time appeared
between the typical conflict and non-conflict cases. The former required a
month longer to decide (15 days longer in obtaining grant of certiorari and
17 days longer to reach disposition after argument) and 18 days more in
applying for certiorari.
It seems fair to conclude that civil tax cases are taking substantially
longer to reach settlement than they were taking 15 years ago, that conflict
cases take the longest, by a significant margin, and that the Court is devoting
substantial time to deciding tax cases.
Action in the. Circuit Courts of Appeals
The decisions of the Supreme Court all arose from the circuit courts of
appeals except for one from a federal district court, three from state courts,
and four from the Court of Claims.1 1 To decide the median tax case, the courts
of appeals required nine months, 22 days. Ten cases, more than 20 percent of
those studied in the courts of appeals, took longer than a year to reach decision.
65. In Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960), the final decision was rendered
after reargument and the reargument date was used in this computation.
66. Since the memorandum cases were not argued, they are not reflected in the time
for reaching argument and decision.
67. Remmlein, A Time Study of Certain Tax Controversies, 16 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
238, 242 (1947).
68. This is the statutory time to apply for certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) (1958).
The median time for the terms studied herein.was in fact 3Y2 months.
69. See Remmlein, A Time Study of Certain Tax Controversies, 16 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 238, 242 (1947).
70. Ibid.
71. In the Supreme Court, 57 tax cases were decided, including memorandum decisions.
Excluding them, 52 were decided. These figures increase to 62 at the intermediate appellate
level, 49 of these cases being counted in the courts of appeals. The difference of 13 is for
the eight cases not appealed to the circuit courts and five cases for which the filing date
of the notice of afpeal was not available from the record and so are not counted.
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Seven were conflict cases7 2 and three were non-conflict. 73 Four cases took over
19 months to decide. Three of these were conflict cases74 and one was non-
conflict. 75 Eleven cases were decided in less than eight months. Seven were
conflict cases76 and four were non-conflict. 77 Apparently the courts of appeals
are inclined to opposite extremes in deciding conflict cases, while the decision
time for non-conflict cases remains fairly steady.
The median conflict case required 10 months, 16 days to reach decision,
over a month longer than the median non-conflict case. This again reverses the
trend found by Remmlein where, although the typical case was decided in
only 11 less days than the typical case in this study, the typical non-conflict
case took a month longer to decide than the typical conflict case.78
It is not surprising to find the typical conflict case using more time in the
courts of appeals. In 18 cases of 26 decided by these courts, and ultimately
reviewed by the Supreme Court because of conflict, a different circuit court
had already passed upon the issue in a conflicting manner. It seems only
natural to take extra time reaching a decision which conflicts with another
circuit and is likely to be reviewed by the Supreme Court. This may also
explain why it takes the courts of appeals more time than the Supreme Court
to decide the typical civil tax case, although the Supreme Court has the added
burden of passing upon the petition for certiorari, a task requiring a median
time of almost two months.
72. Commissioner v. Acker, 258 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1958), aff'd, 361 U.S. 87 (1959),
United States v. Price, 263 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 361 U.S. 304 (1960), Com-
missioner v. Stern, 342 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1957), aff'd, 357 U.S. 39 (1958), Putnam v.
Commissioner, 224 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1955), aff'd, 352 U.S. 82 (1956), Haynes v. UnitedStates, 233 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 81 (1951), Commissioner v. South-
west Exploration Co., 220 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1955), rev'd, 350 U.S. 308 (1956), United
States v. Leslie Salt Co., 218 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1954), aff'd, 350 U.S. 383 (1956).
73. Commissioner v. Wrather, 241 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 356 U.S. 260(1958), Fleming v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 356 U.S. 260 (1958),
Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 585 (6th Cir. 1956), aff'd,
353 U.S. 180 (1957).
74. United States v. Price, 263 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 361 U.S. 304 (1960),
Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 220 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1955), rev'd, 350 U.S.308 (1956), United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 218 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1954), afftd, 350 U.S.
383 (1956).
75. Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 585 (6th Cir. 1956),
aff'd, 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
76. New Hampshire Fire Ins Co. v. Scanlon, 267 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1959), aff'd,362 U.S. 404 (1960), Stanton v. United States, 268 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1959), vacated,363 U.S. 278 (1960), Hertz Corp. v. United States, 268 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1959), affld,
364 U.S. 122 (1960), Commissioner v. Glover, 253 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1958), rev'd, 360
U.S. 446 (1959), Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 241 F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 1957),
rev'd, 356 U.S. 274 (1958), Colony Inc. v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1957),
rev'd, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), National Lead Co. v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.
1956), aff'd, 352 U.S. 313 (1957).
77. Puerifoy v. Commissioner, 254 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1957), aff'd, 358 U.S. 59(1958), F. Strauss & Son, Inc. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1958), aff'd, 358
U.S. 498 (1959), United States v. R. F. Ball Construction Co., Inc., 239 F.2d 384 (5th
Cir. 1956), rev'd, 355 U.S. 587 (1958), Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 242
F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1957), aff'd, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
78. Remmiein, A Time Study of Certain Tax Controversies, 16 G~o. Wash. L. Rev.
238, 243 (1947).
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The civil tax caseload of the courts of appeals is also substantial. During
the five fiscal years ending June 30, 1955-59, 2112 tax cases were appealed
to these courts. From the Tax Court came 1238 and 874 were from the district
courts. These appeals represented 11.5 percent of all appeals to the circuits.79
If a single court of tax appeals were adopted, it would doubtless have a bene-
ficial effect on the present courts of appeals. To be relieved of civil tax appeals
would substantially lighten the load of these courts, no doubt a desirable end
in view of the present overloading of many of them, which requires sitting
by district court judges and retired circuit court judges.80 And these courts
would of course continue to have plenty to do. About 88.5 percent of their
appellate load would remain by retention of their usual jurisdiction, except
for civil tax cases, embracing cases to which the United States is a party, diver-
sity suits, federal question cases and admiralty cases. 81
Could a single court of tax appeals efficiently handle all civil tax appeals?
Not only does this involve present appeals to the circuit courts, but also possi-
ble appeals from the Court of Claims and perhaps from state courts.
In the courts of appeals, the average number of civil tax appeals for this
five year period was 422, 247 from the Tax Court and 175 from the district
courts. 82 Appeals from the Court of Claims can be estimated by taking the
same percentage of Court of Claims decisions that Tax Court appeals bear
to Tax Court decisions.83 The probable appeals from the Court of Claims
would be 20 per year.8 4 This would increase to 442 the probable appeals to a
single court of tax appeals.
79. The percentage of civil appeals was 13.7. 1955 Annual Report of the Director
of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 160; 1956 Annual Report of the
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 208; 1957 Annual Report
of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 168; 1958 Annual
Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 156;
1959 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, 174, 178.
80. 1959 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, 77-79.
81. Id. at 178-79.
82. 1959 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts, 174, 178; 1958 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts, 156; 1957 Anuual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts, 168; 1956 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts, 208; 1955 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts, 160. The number varied from a low in 1959 of 376 (204 from the
Tax Court and 172 from the district courts) to a high in 1958 of 457 (253 from the
Tax Court and 204 from the district courts).
83. The Tax Court is used for comparative purposes since it has in common with
the Court of Claims the lack of jury trials.
84. The Court of Claims decided 271 civil tax cases in the five fiscal years ending
June 30, 1959, an average of 54 per year. 1959 Annual Report of the Comm. of Int.
Rev., 130; 1958 Annual Report of the Comm. of Int. Rev., 126; 1957 Annual Report of
the Comm. of Int. Rev., 117; 1956 Annual Report of the Comm. of Int. Rev., 31; 1955
Annual Report of the Comm. of Int. Rev., 29. Thirty-seven percent of Tax Court decisions
were appealed for this period. 1959 Annual Report of the Comm. of Int. Rev., 129; 1958
Annual Report of the Comm. of Int. Rev., 125; 1957 Annual Report of the Comm. of
Int. Rev., 116; 1956 Annual Report of the Comm. of Int. Rev., 121; 1955 Annual Report
of the Comm. of Int. Rev., 113. The same percentage of appeals from Court of Claims
decisions is 20 appeals.
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Appeals from state courts present a more difficult problem. Although the
Supreme Court reviewed only three such cases in the five terms studied, as in
the case of the Court of Claims, review is by certiorari,85 and no accurate
measure for appeals is available. One writer feels no major problem is present
since it is rare that a state decision presents a federal tax question.8" Perhaps
this is so. If not, an alternative procedure for state court appeals might become
necessary. Such appeals will therefore be disregarded in further discussion.
Disregarding for the time being any possible diminution in appeals due
to lack of more than one circuit court, the maximum case load of a single court
of tax appeals would be 442 cases per year. How many of these cases would
require significant time of the Court by going to written opinion, or at least
disposition on the merits? The available data gives no direct statistics on the
percentage of tax appeals disposed of by the circuit courts by opinion or on
the merits.8 7 But sufficient accuracy can no doubt be obtained, without making
physical count of courts of appeals opinions, 88 by applying to civil tax appeals
the same percentage that civil cases decided by the circuits after hearing or
submission bears to all civil cases decided by them. For the five year period,
the courts of appeals, on the average, disposed of 3064 civil cases, 2359 of
them, or 77 percent, after hearing or submission.80 Applying this percentage
to the 442 civil tax appeals, an average of 340 cases per year would be decided
after hearing or submission and an average of 102 per year would be disposed of
without hearing or submission. 90
Concededly, it is no easy matter for a court to dispose of 340 civil tax
cases a year after hearing or submission. But, it must be remembered that if
a court of tax appeals is created, presumably it will eliminate a good number
of appeals presently taken after the issue involved has already been passed
on by a circuit court.
Even without taking that fact into account, the picture is not at all bleak.
As the following chart shows, four of the courts of appeals are consistently
disposing of about 340 cases, or more, after hearing or submission.
85. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257, 2101(c) (1958).
86. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1153, 1165-66
(1944).
87. The anuual reports of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue give incomplete
results by failing to include courts of appeals tax decisions in debtor proceedings and lien
cases. See 1959 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 130-32.
88. Which, no doubt, is a less accurate reflection of the burden of tax cases than
cases disposed of after hearing or submission.
89. 1959 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, 170; 1958 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, 148; 1957 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, 160; 1956 Annual Report of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 200; 1955 Annual Report of the
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 152.
90. Compare this number with the 309 tax opinions written by the courts of appeals
in 1943. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1153, 1176-78
(1944).
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Fiscal Year
Ending 6-30-59 6-30-58 6-30-57 6-30-56 6-30-55
Cases disposed
of after hearing
or submission
Dist. of Columbia 352 399 340 338 314
2d Circuit 330 349 351 369 349
5th Circuit 449 467 414 472 467
9th Circuit 346 318 357 397 387
Totals 147791 153392 146293 157694 151795
Average 392 383 365 394 379
Also interesting in this connection is the load of the Supreme Court.
In the five terms beginning with October 1955, the Court has disposed of an
average of 271 cases per annum on the merits, together with a yearly average
of 1474 petitions for certiorari. The following chart shows the breakdown.
Dispositions Dispositions of
Term on Merits Petitions for Cert.
1959 24596 157496
1958 27997 150397
1957 32098 146998
1956 26699 145999
1955 246100 1366100
Totals 1356 7371
Average 271 1474
Taking into consideration that dispositions of petitions for certiorari is' an
extremely time-consuming task, 01' and that cases reviewed by the Supreme Court
are of far more than average difficulty and importance,102 there appears little
doubt that a single court could efficiently decide 340 civil tax appeals annually.
As already indicated, it is impossible to determine with precision how
much the load of a court of tax appeals would be reduced by absence of co-
91. See, 1959 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, 170-171.
92. See, 1958 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, 145-150.
93. See, 1957 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, 160-162.
94. See, 1956 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, 200-202.
95. See, 1955 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, 152-154.
96. The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 99 (1960).
97. The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 129 (1959).
98. The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 77, 99 (1958).
99. The Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 83, 97 (1957).
100. The Supreme Court, 1955 Term, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 83, 99 (1956).
101. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, Forward: The Time Chart of the justices,
73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 87 (1959).
102. See Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1153,
1179 (1944).
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ordinate review courts. The above analysis does not take this factor into ac-
count, assuming no reduction whatsoever in the over-all case load. No doubt,
as to tax appeals, this presents a more pessimistic picture than is warranted.
Plain sense dictates that appeals will no longer be taken on issues already
decided adversely to the would-be appellant at the circuit court level.' 03 With
a single rule controlling all circuits, it also follows there will be less contest-
breeding activity at the administrative level, resulting in fewer litigated cases
and fewer appeals.
Proceedings in the Lower Courts
The cases studied were tried, 32 in the federal district courts, 26 in
the Tax Court, four in the Court of Claims, and three in the state courts. 10 4
Again the results are significantly different from those in Remmlein's study. For
those years, the median tax case spent 18 months in the trial court with no
difference between conflict and non-conflict cases.' 05 In this study the typical
case went through trial in one year, 11 months and eight days, and the typical
non-conflict case required slightly under one month longer than the typical
conflict case.'0 6 As in the courts of appeals, the majority of the cases taking the
longest time and the shortest time were conflict cases. 10 7 But this is the
only level of judicial or administrative activity where the typical non-conflict
case required more time than the typical conflict case for disposition. And
this is certainly as it should be since the great bulk of the non-conflict cases
were eventually reviewed by the Supreme Court because of importance of the
issues, or difficulty on the part of lower courts in applying Supreme Court
precedents.
Action at the Administrative Level'0 8
The time taken in the various stages of administrative procedure cannot
be determined with the kind of accuracy possible in reaching results for the
courts. Accurate measurement is present only in determination of the time
between the tax year and beginning of the proceeding in the trial court. The
median tax case arrived at this stage in four years, five months and one day,
the deficiency notice having been sent a little under three months previously.
103. This assumes the would-be appellant would not appeal in an attempt to reach
the Supreme Court on the ground that the issue involved is of national importance.
With the Court reviewing so few cases on this ground, undoubtedly the assumption is
warranted. Moreover, the Supreme Court may have already passed upon, or denied
certiorari to, the prior case involving the same issue.
104. Of these 65 cases, 63 were used in studying the trial court level, data regarding
the filing date of the suit being unavailable for 2 cases.
105. Remmlein, A Time Study of Certain Tax Controversies, 16 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
238, 243-44 (1947).
106. The time was measured from the filing of the petition or complaint to the
date of judgment.
107. Cases taking over three years were seven conflict and four non-conflict. Cases
taking under one year were 11 conflict and one non-conflict.
108. The same 63 cases studied at the trial level were studied at the administrative
level. The suit filing date was unavailable for two cases.
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This is considerably longer than for the cases studied by Remmlein where,
for the first five terms studied, the typical case arrived at suit in the third year
after the tax year. 0 9 For all eight terms of that study, the time was greater,
3.7 years elapsing before the deficiency notice was received in the typical case, 110
administrative action taking a year more for the typical case in the last three
terms of the study."'
The typical conflict case required four years, nine months and four days to
proceed to suit, more than a year longer than the typical non-conflict case.
Apparently this trend began developing in the last three terms studied by
Remmlein where, as compared with the previous five terms, administrative
determinations in conflict cases were 16 months longer, and in non-conflict
cases, five months longer."12
Long intervals of over six years were present in 20 cases, 13 of them
conflict cases. Seven of these cases, 13 only one of them a non-conflict case," 4
required more than nine years to proceed to suit. Eight cases reached suit in
the comparatively short time of under two years. Three of these were con-
flict casesn  and five were non-conflict.16
Because the procedures are different for refund and non-refund cases,"17
the results of administrative determination were compiled for these categories
separately. The refund cases required a median time of about six months
longer than the others to reach suit. Within each category, the pattern be-
tween conflict and non-conflict cases remained consistent; the former took
substantially longer to arrive in court." 8
109. Remmlein, Tax Controversies-Where Goes the Time?, 13 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
416, 425 (1945).
110. Remmlein, A Time Study of Certain Tax Controversies, 16 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
238, 244 (1947).
111. Id. at 249.
112. Ibid.
113. United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304 (1960); Stanton v. United States, 363 U.S.
278 (1960); United States v. Allen-Bradley Co., 352 U.S. 306 (1957); National Lead Co. v.
Commissioner, 352 U.S. 313 (1957); United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98 (1957);
Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956); Sims v. United States,
359 U.S. 108 (1959).
114. Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108 (1959).
115. New Hampshire Fire Insurance Co. v. Scanlon, 362 U.S. 404 (1960); Aquilino v.
United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960); United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 252(1960).
116. United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299 (1960); Puerifoy v. Commissioner, 358
U.S. 59 (1958); United States v. R. F. Ball Construction Co., Inc., 355 U.S. 87 (1958);
Tank Truck Rentals Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958); United States v.
Vorreiter, 355 U.S. 15 (1957).
117. If the taxpayer wishes to contest a deficiency determination before payment
thereof, he must file his petition in the Tax Court within 90 days of the deficiency notice.
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 § 6213(a). If he chooses to pay the deficiency determined,
or seeks refund of taxes paid with his return, he may file claim for refund within two
years from the time the tax was paid or three years from the time the return was filed,
whichever expires the later. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 6511(a).
118. An attempt was also made to find, for the non-refund suits, the time intervals
between the tax year, deficiency notice, and suit date, and for the refund suits, the time
intervals between the tax year, payment of the assessment, the refund claim and the
suit date. However the records on appeal too often did not reveal dates for many of these
items and so the statistics are too sparse for reliable results.
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Summary of All Levels
The civil tax cases decided by the Supreme Court in the five terms studied
can be reconstructed into a composite, or typical, tax case. Suit will be insti-
tuted by filing of petition or complaint about four and one-half years after
the tax year. Almost two years will be spent in the trial court. Within 60 days
notice of appeal will be filed in a court of appeals and the case will spend
almost 10 months there. After decision by the court of appeals, 3-1/2 months
will be used in applying for certiorari. The writ will be granted in two months
and argued about six months thereafter. After another two months the Supreme
Court will reach decision.
If the case is reviewed by the Supreme Court because of a conflict in the
courts of appeals, it will take a month longer than a non-conflict case in both
the Supreme Court and court of appeals, and will be a month less in reaching
disposition by the trial court. However, at the administrative level, the con-
flict case will take more than a year longer than the case not eventually re-
viewed because of a conflict.
Both this study and that made by Remmlein seem to agree on at least
one point: cases reviewed by the Supreme Court because of conflict appear to
be causing greater difficulty at the administrative level than other cases.
110
Not only are the median times separated by over a year, but a substantial
number of the conflict cases took an extraordinary amount of time at this level.
Moreover, the time required for administrative determination seems to be
increasing for all civil tax cases. 120 Over one-half the time between the tax
year and ultimate disposition precedes institution of the proceeding in the trial
court. Thereafter, the time used does not appear extraordinary though it has
significantly increased since the terms studied by Remmlein.
The Conflict-Resolving Period
The "conflict-resolving period" is comprised of two factors, which we
shall call the "conflict-developing period" and the "conflict-review period."
The conflict-developing period is the time between the first decision of a
circuit court of appeals deciding a particular issue and a later decision of
another circuit which is reviewed by the Supreme Court, because it conflicts
either with that first decision or some intervening court of appeals decision on
119. Remmlein, A Time Study of Certain Tax Controversies, 16 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
238, 250 (1947). See also Rice, note 40, supra, 1959 P-H U 32, 257 who said as to a
Court of Tax Appeals: ". . . such a court would cut down the amount of tax litigation
and provide greater certainty as to the law than exists today. . . With a single court of
tax appeals, most tax questions would be resolved at that level without all the loss of
time involved in 'jockeying' for position and 'shopping' for a favorable Circuit in order
to develop a conflict which would warrant Supreme Court review."
120. In attempting to apply the Internal Revenue Code with national uniformity,
perhaps the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is meeting the same problem which faces
the Tax Court when it disagrees with court authority. See Lawrence, 21 T.C. 713, 719
(1957), rev'd, 258 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1958).
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that issue.121 This is part of the period during which an issue remains unsettled
because of possibility of review by the Supreme Court on development of
a conflict.
The conflict-review period is the time between the decision of the court
of appeals which is reviewed by the Supreme Court because of conflict with
another circuit court, and the decision of the Supreme Court resolving that
conflict.
The conflict-developing period and the conflict-review period make up the
conflict-resolving period, the total time an issue remains unsettled because
of the possibility of review by the Supreme Court upon the development of a
conflict. This is the period which would be eliminated by doing away with the
conflict-producing situation inherent in eleven co-ordinate courts of appeals.
During the five terms studied, the Supreme Court reviewed 35 conflict
cases. In deciding these cases, 22 conflicts were resolved. 1 22 Eight of these
conflicts required more than 10 years to develop, five of these taking more
than 15 years. The issue in United States v. Price123 was first decided by a
court of appeals in 1933.124 It took 25.3 years for the conflict to develop and
26.3 years before it was resolved by the Supreme Court. The issue involved in
121. Sometimes the court of appeals decision reviewed by the Supreme Court is in
accord with the first court of appeals decision on the issue involved but conflicts with
an intervening court of appeals decision which was not reviewed because a writ of
certiorari was not applied for. In such cases, although the conflict developed with the
first such intervening decision, the conflict-developing period runs to the decision reviewed
by the Supreme Court. It is this longer period during which the issue remains unsettled
because of the possibility of review by the Supreme Court.
Two such situations provide examples. The decision of the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Price, 263 F.2d 382 (1959), revd, 361 U.S. 304 (1960), conflicted with Associated
Metals v. Delaney, 176 F.2d 179 (1st Cir. 1949) and Moore v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 108
F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1940). The latter two cases in turn conflicted with Mutual Lumber Co.
v. Poe, 66 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1933) and McCarthy Co. v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 618
(9th Cir. 1935), cert. den., 298 U.S. 655 (1936), which Price followed. The first conflict
occurred when Cleveland Ry. Co. was decided. However, until Price, certiorari was never
applied for after the conflict arose. In New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Scanlon, 267
F.2d 941 (1959), aff'd, 362 U.S. 404 (1960), the Second Circuit conflicted with Ronthensies
v. Ullman, 110 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1949), Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952)
and Eras, Inc. v. Dudley, 234 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1956). The latter three cases in turn
conflicted with Goldman v. American Dealers Service, 135 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1943) and
Re Behrens, 39 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1930). Again, certiorari was not applied for after the
conflict arose until New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co.
See also the situation arising in Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S.
274 (1958). The first conflict on the issue decided in that case occurred with the decision
of Bohnen v. Harrison, 199 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1952) which was affirmed per curiam
by an equally divided Supreme Court, 345 U.S. 946 (1953) in effect leaving the issue open
and a conflict outstanding.
122. A conflict sometimes involved one, and often more than one, case before the
Court. In Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87 (1959), United States v. Price, 361 U.S.
304 (1960) and Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960) no other cases involved in
the conflict being resolved were before the Court. Thus each of these cases constituted a
conflict group. However, Massey Motors Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92 (1960),
Commissioner v. Evans, 364 U.S. 92 (1960) (which were reviewed as in conflict with one
another) and Hertz Corp. v. United States, 364 U.S. 122 (1960) were decided as companion
cases because of similar issues and comprise one conflict group.
123. 361 U.S. 304 (1960).
124. Mutual Lumber Co. v. Poe, 66 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1933).
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Flora v. United States'125 was decided by the Second Circuit in 1940.120
The conflict required 17.2 years to develop and 19.9 years to be resolved. 127
The issue in New Hampshire Fire Insurance Co. v. Scanlon12 8 was first decided
by a court of appeals in 1930.1-2 The conflict developed in 29.2 years and
it was more than 30 years before it was resolved. United States v. Brosnan'3 0
achieved a conflict in 19.4 years' 31 and more than 20.5 years elapsed before
it was resolved. The conflict on the issue in Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner'8 2
developed in 15.3 years 13 3 and needed almost 16.5 years for resolution.
The conflicts requiring more than 10 years to develop comprised more
than 45 percent of all conflicts resolved by the Court during these five terms.
For the eight terms beginning in October 1939, during which the Court re-
solved 80 conflicts, there were only three conflicts longer than 10 years in
development, 3.75 percent. 3 4 Only one of these conflicts was resolved in the
first five years studied135 and it took about 15 years to develop.'8 0 Two were
resolved in the last three terms studied, one of these taking 64 years to de-
velop.13 7 It appears the Court is resolving far fewer conflicts but that slow-
developing ones are exceedingly more frequent. For the terms studied, the
chances were almost one in two that a conflict resolved by the Supreme Court
took more than 10 years to develop.
Also of interest are the kinds of issues involved in these slow-developing
conflicts. One would almost expect them to be of the sort that seldom arise
because they affect relatively few taxpayers. A few of the cases may fit this
description. New Hampshire Fire Insurance Co. v. Scanlon'38 decided the
rare procedural issue of whether, in a summary proceeding, the plaintiff could
try the government's right to seize or distrain a debt running from a third
person to a delinquent taxpayer, plaintiff claiming a superior interest in the
debt. Even here, there were already five court of appeals decisions, 13 9 the first
125. 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
126. Coates v. United States, 111 F.2d 609.
127. The conflict-review period of 2.7 years was due to the case being decided after
rehearing, the original decision in the 1957 term having disposed of the case on extrinsic
evidence rather than upon interpretation of the statute involved. The decision in the
1959 term eventually resolved the conflict. See 362 U.S. 145, 151 n.6.
128. 362 U.S. 404 (1960).
129. Re Behrens, 39 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1930).
130. 363 U.S. 237 (1960).
131. The conflict was with Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 107
F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1939).
132. 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
133. The first court of appeals decision on the issue involved was Foster's Estate v.
Commissioner, 131 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1942).
134. Remmlein, A Time Study of Certain Tax Controversies, 16 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
238, 245 (1947).
135. Ibid.
136. Remmlein, Tax Controversies--Where Goes the Time?, 13 Geo. Wash L. Rev.
416, 427-28 (1945).
137. Remmlein, A Time Study of Certain Tax Controversies, 16 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
238, 245-46 (1947).
138. 362 U.S. 404 (1960).
139. Re Behrens, 39 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1930), Rothensis v. Ullman, 110 F.2d 590
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one having been handed down as far back as 1930.140 Fidelity-Philadelphia
Trust Co. v. Smith1 41 held that the gross estate did not include proceeds
of irrevocably assigned life insurance policies though the decedent purchased the
policies in combination with annuity contracts from which she received pay-
ments for life. Three earlier court of appeals decisions existed on this point.
142
The troublesome capital-gains definition-sale or exchange of "property' 43
was treated in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner.-4 4 Even this
somewhat rarefied and difficult issue had already been passed upon three times
in the courts of appeals' 45 and continues to reach the Supreme Court.' 46
Clearly crucial to fair and efficient administration of the revenue laws
were the slow-developing conflicts involving procedural issues. United States v.
Price47 held that a Form 870 ("Waiver of Restrictions on Assessment and
Collection") signed by the taxpayer was effective to allow the Commissioner
to sue for the tax without issuing a 90 day statutory notice of deficiency. This
issue had already been decided four times by the circuit courts of appeals, 148
the first time in 1933.149 It nevertheless remained open until the magic con-
flict was resolved by the Supreme Court in 1960. This is a curious state of
affairs in view of the fact that a waiver of restriction and assessment, as a
matter of standard practice, is routinely signed by the taxpayer, and probably
relied upon by the Government, in every case involving settlement of an
asserted tax deficiency.
The issue in Flora v. United States'50 was no less central to fair, efficient
and predictable tax administration. And, as in Price, the question was a com-
paratively simple one: can a taxpayer sue for a refund of taxes where he has
not paid the full amount of the assessment? Over the years, this issue has
undoubtedly arisen thousands of times, if not in litigation, at least in the minds
of tax counsel. It was first decided by a court of appeals, against the Govern-
(3d Cir. 1940), Goldman v. American Dealers Service, 135 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1943),
Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952), Eras Inc. v. Dudley, 234 F.2d 178
(3d Cir. 1956).
140. Re Behrens, 39 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1930).
141. 356 U.S. 274 (1958).
142. Burr v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1946); Conway v. Glenn, 193
F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1952); Bohnen v. Harrison, 199 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1952), aff'd, by an
equally divided court, 345 U.S. 946 (1953).
143. Int. Rev. Code of 1939 §§ 117(a)(1), (4); Int. Rev. Code of 1954 §§ 1221,
1222.
144. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
145. Commissioner v. Farmers and Ginners Cotton Oil Co., 120 F.2d 772 (5th
Cir. 1941); Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1945);
Makransky's Estate v. Commissioner, 154 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1946).
146. Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958); Commissioner v.
Gillette Motor Transport Inc., 364 U.S. 130 (1960).
147. 361 U.S. 304 (1960).
148. Mutual Lumber Co. v. Poe, 66 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1933); McCarthy Co. v.
C.I.R., 80 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1935), cert. den., 298 U.S. 655 (1936); Moore v. Cleveland
Ry. Co., 108 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1940); Associated Metals v. Delaney, 176 F.2d 170 (1st
Cir. 1949).
149. Mutual Lumber Co. v. Poe, 66 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1933).
150. 362 U.S. (1950).
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ment, in 1940.151 It was not until 20 years later that the Supreme Court finally
put the issue to rest. And, by the Government's own estimate, there
have been an average of 1000 refund suits a year since 1920,152 with the
Government blowing hot and cold on the issue both before and after
1940.153 Again a curious state of affairs.
Colony Inc. v. Commissioner54 held that an overstatement of a deduction
resulting in an understatement of income does not constitute an "omission from
gross income" so as to make the five year statute of limitations applicable
under §275(c) of the 1939 Code. Over a span of 15 years, this comparatively
simple issue had been passed upon by five courts of appeals'", and the Court of
Claims. 5 6
Other commonly recurring issues were presented in United States v.
Brosnan,'57 which decided that an inferior federal tax lien is extinguished by
the foreclosure of a superior mortgage lien in accordance with state law, though
the United States was not, and was not required to be, a party to the fore-
closure, and in United States v. Anderson & Clayton Co.'58 The latter case
held a corporation did not realize taxable gain from the sale of treasury stock
to employees since it was not dealing in its own shares as it might in the
shares of another corporation within Treasury Regulations 111, §29.22(a)-15.
After numerous uniform holdings by the courts of appeals to the contrary, 59
the Court held it irrelevant whether the treasury shares were resold, or retired
and new shares issued.'6 0
Apparently then, the slow-developing conflicts involved mainly issues affect-
ing a broad range of taxpayers, some of which are difficult ones, most of which
are comparatively simple, and almost all of which had been decided many times
in the courts of appeals.
Seven of the conflicts developed within 1.2 years, six of them taking under
one year to develop. The shortest conflict-developing period was 30 days,16'
151. Coates v. United States, 111 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1940).
152. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 170-71 (1960).
153. See discussion at 362 U.S. 181-85 and accompanying footnotes.
154. 357 U.S. 128 (1958).
155. Uptegrove Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 204 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1953); Slaff v.
Commissioner, 220 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1955); Davis v. Hightower, 230 F.2d 549 (Sth Cir.
1956); Foster's Estate v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1942); Reis v. Com-
missioner, 142 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1944); Goodenow v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 20 (8th
Cir. 1956).
156. Lazarus v. Commissioner, 136 Ct. CI. 283 (1956).
157. 363 U.S. 237 (1959).
158. 350 U.S. 55 (1955).
159. E.g., Commissioner v. Landers Corp., 210 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1954); Com-
missioner v. H. W. Porter & Co., 187 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1951); Commissioner v. Rollins
Burdick Hunter Co., 174 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1949); Commissioner v. Batten, Barton,
Durstine & Osborne. Inc.. 171 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1948); Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner,
133 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1943).
160. 350 U.S. 55, 60 (1955).
161. Massey Motors Inc. v. United States, 264 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1959), aff'd, 364
U.S. 92 (1960) and Commissioner v. Evans, 264 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 364 U.S.
92 (1960) confficted and were decided as companion cases together with Hertz Corp. v.
United States, 268 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1959), aff'd, 364 U.S. 122 (1960).
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with others taking only 35 days,'8 88 days,163 four months, five days,164
nine months, 27 days,165 and 11-1/2 months. 0 6 The longest conflict-developing
period of these seven was 1.2 years.16 7 These conflicts were resolved, respec-
tively, in 1.4 years, 1.4 years, 1.38 years, one year, 1.9 years, 2.5 years and 2.45
years. It is evident that even though conflicts develop very rapidly, the issue
involved will generally remain unsettled for over a year. And this period is
almost entirely attributable to review by the Supreme Court, which is neces-
sitated by the presence of conflicts without regard to how rapidly they develop.
The over-all statistics for the terms studied are shown by the tabulation
on the following page. For purposes of comparison, they are coupled with those
for the eight terms beginning October, 1939.168
Remmlein found that for the two terms beginning October, 1939, 75
percent of the conflicts developed in under one year. For the next five terms
only 22 to 45 percent of the conflict-developing periods were under one year,
and in the 1946 term, neither of the two conflicts developed in less than a
year.169 For the five terms of the present study, only 22.7 percent of the
conflicts developed in under one year; in the 1955 term, 16-2/3 percent;
the 1956 term, 33-1/3 percent; the 1957 term, none; the 1958 term, none; the
1959 term, 33-1/3 percent. If any trend is being established, it seems to be
that conflict-developing periods are growing longer. The most persuasive
evidence of this is the difference in the over-all median conflict-developing
period of the two studies. For the earlier study it was two years. 170 For the
162. Commissioner v. Acker, 258 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1958), aff'd, 361 U.S. 87 (1959)
was the first circuit court of appeals decision on the issue reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Thirty-five days after it was handed down, and before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
had decided the Commissioner's petition for rehearing, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided Patchen v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 544 (1958) contrariwise, developing the
conflict. Within the next eleven days there were decided Abbott v. Commissioner, 258
F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958) and Hansen v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1958), which
were in accord with Patchen. In this situation, Acker, the case reviewed by the Supreme
Court, was decided before Patchen, the case creating the conflict. But since it was
reviewed because of that conflict, the period between the two cases is used as the conflict-
developing period. See Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 89 n.3 (1959).
163. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 265 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 278
(1960) and Stanton v. United States, 268 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1959), vacated, 363 U.S. 278
(1960) conflicted and were decided as companion cases.
164. United States v. Huntington Beach Co., 132 Ct. Cl. 427 (1955), aff'd, 350
U.S. 308 (1956) and Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 220 F.2d 58 (9th Cir.
1955), rev'd, 350 U.S. 308 (1956) conflicted and were decided as companion cases.
165. Aquilino v. United States, 4 N.Y.2d 869, 174 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1957), vacated,
363 U.S. 509 (1960) conflicted with Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. New York
City Housing Authority, 241 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1957).
166. National Lead Co. v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1956), aff'd, 352
U.S. 313 (1957) conflicted with United States v. Ohio Power Co., 131 Ct. CI. 95 (1955),
rev'd, 353 U.S. 98 (1957), and United States v. Allen-Bradley Co., 134 Ct. CI. 800 (1956),
rev'd, 352 U.S. 306 (1957).
167. Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transport Inc., 265 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1959),
rev'd, 364 U.S. 130 (1960) conflicted with Midwest Motors Inc. v. Commissioner, 251
F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1958).
168. See Remmlein, A Time Study of Certain Tax Controversies, 16 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 238, 246 (1947).
169. Ibid.
170. Id. at 245.
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Median Conflict- Median Conflict- Shortest Conflict-
Developing Period Resolving Period Developing Period
Term Yrs. Mos. Days Yrs. Mos. Days Yrs. Mos. Days
1959-60 1 2 6 3 4 12 1 0
1958-59 2 1 2 3 1 4 2 1 2
1957-58 10 7 11 11 9 11 2 9 29
1956-57 3 5 21 4 5 2 11 13
1955-56 7 4 0 8 5 0 4 9
1946-47 3 0 0 Not shown 1 7 24
1945-46 2 33 1 (sic) " " 1
1944-45 1 6 0 " " 16
1943-44 4 6 3 " " 0
1942-43 1 6 3 " " 29
1941-42 1 3 1 " " 1 22
1940-41 8 3 " " 21
1939-40 8 3 " " 9
Shortest Conflict- Longest Conflict- Longest Conflict-
Resolving Period Developing Period Resolving Period
Term Yrs. Mos. Days Yrs. Mos. Days Yrs. Mos. Days
1959-60 1 2 5 29 3 19 30 1 22
1958-59 3 1 4 2 1 2 3 1 4
1957-58 4 1 11 15 3 12 16 4 29
1956-57 1 10 21 4 1 9 5 5 1
1955-56 11 20 13 2 16 14 4 28
1946-47 Not shown 3 11 3 Not shown
1945-46 " " 64 4 1 " "
1944-45 " " 4 7 6 " "
1943-44 " " 14 11 13 " "
1942-43 " " 8 8 6 " "
1941-42 " " 4 10 2 " "
1940-41 " " 8 9 26 " "
1939-40 " " 2 0 0 " "
five terms beginning in 1955, it was more than twice as long, four years, one
month, 24 days.
Of greater importance than the conflict-developing period is the conflict-
resolving period. Remmlein did not discuss this longer period as such. How-
ever, she does indicate that, for the eight terms studied, the median time from
the circuit court of appeals decision to the Supreme Court decision in conflict
cases was nine months, 17 days.' 7 ' Adding this to the median conflict-devel-
oping period of two years, we have, for these eight terms, a conflict-resolving
period of two years, nine months, 17 days. For the five terms beginning in 1955,
this period was five years and four months.
Is not 5-1/3 years, or even 2-3/4 years for that matter, after it is decided
by a court of appeals, too long for a tax issue to remain unsettled? We have
seen that the issues in cases resolving slow-developing conflicts, such as Flora v.
United States172 and United States v. Price'73 are comparatively simple ones
171. Id. at 242.
172. 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
173. 361 U.S. 304 (1960).
NEED FOR COURT OF TAX APPEALS
that unquestionably affect taxpayer planning and day by day administration of
revenue laws. Rapid, final answers are needed on these issues. No less are they
necessary on the knottier issues whose impact is as wide-spread, such as the
effect of state law on federal tax liens.1 " 4 And we cannot afford to wait need-
lessly for clarification of such basic concepts as those involved in Massey
Motors, Inc. v. United States"75 (depreciation basis of a business asset where
it is customarily sold and replaced long before the end of its economic life),
Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner"'6 ("property" constituting a
capital asset), Putnam v. Commissioner"'" (distinction between loss and bad
debt), Commissioner v. Hansen et a/.178 (dealers reserve "when is it income"
cases), and Commissioner v. Duberstein179 and Stanton v. United States'"0
(gift or income as to non-obligatory payments made by one businessman
to another for past business-producing "favors," or from employer to employee
"in appreciation" of past services), all being conflict cases decided during
the terms studied.
The evidence clearly demonstrates that conflicts do not discriminate as
to whether they will develop slowly or rapidly depending on the complexity
of the issue, or the number of taxpayers it affects. Conflicts involving the
simplest issues, with the most wide-spread effect, can develop very slowly, as
they did in Flora (suit for refund before payment of the full assessment)
and Price (validity of Form 870 when it is signed before issuance of the 90
day letter), or very rapidly as in Commissioner v. Acker' 81 (where taxpayer
filed no declaration of estimated tax, whether there could be imposed both
the penalty for failure to file and for substantial underestimation),182 And
issues involved in slow-developing conflicts are generally decided many times
in the courts of appeals before resolution by the Supreme Court. This is not
an encouraging situation, especially since conflict-developing periods are be-
coming substantially longer.
Even where a conflict develops with extreme rapidity, the present system
requires the issue involved to remain unsettled for a substantial period of time.
And during this time, administration, planning and self-assessment must go on.
174. See United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960); United States v. Durham
Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522 (1960); Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
175. 364 U.S. 92 (1960). See also, Hertz Corp. v. United States, 364 U.S. 122 (1960).
176. 350 U.S. 46 (1955). See also, Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transport Inc.,
364 U.S. 130 (1960).
177. 352 U.S. 82 (1956).
178. 360 U.S. 446 (1959).
179. 364 U.S. 78 (1960).
180. Ibid.
181. 361 U.S. 87 (1959). The conflict developed in 35 days.
182. The Int. Rev. Code of 1954, by § 6654, has eliminated this issue for taxable
years beginning after January 1, 1955 by providing a single addition to tax of six percent
for underpayment whatever the reason. The issue remains alive however because of cases
pending under the 1939 Code. See Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 89 n.3 (1959).
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CONCLUSIONS
It is evident that the presence of multiple appellate courts having co-
ordinate rank has considerable discernible impact upon the judiciary and in the
administration of revenue laws.
The greatest portion of the Supreme Court's civil tax caseload is made
up of cases reviewed because of conflicting decisions in the courts of appeals.
In the five terms studied, there were 33 such cases, 63.4 percent of all civil
tax cases.183 If the Supreme Court did not review conflict cases, 27 of the
544 full opinions written during these terms would have been unnecessary, and
the 637 cases decided by full opinion would have been reduced to 604. Further-
more, after decision by a court of appeals, the typical conflict case required
1-1/2 months longer to dispose of than the typical non-conflict case.
There is no available evidence to show accurately the amount of litigation
in the courts of appeals on issues already decided at that level. The office of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue is undoubtedly in the best position to make
a study of such litigation, based on facts of each appeal from the trial courts.
Unquestionably, it would provide a great deal of insight regarding the effect
of our appellate system.
The available evidence shows that the typical tax case spends more time
in the courts of appeals than in the Supreme Court and that the typical case
eventually reviewed by the Court because of conflict takes the longest to
decide by more than a month. As with the Supreme Court, conflict cases seem
to be causing more difficulty than non-conflict cases.
The civil tax caseload of the courts of appeals is very substantial. For a
five year period, the average number of civil tax appeals was 422, 247 from
the Tax Court and 175 from the district courts. These appeals represented 11.5
percent of all appeals to the circuits. Although no accurate determination can
be made of the reduction in this load by adoption of a single court of tax
appeals, it would no doubt be significant. At least this much is indicated by
the number of times an issue is decided in the courts of appeals before a
slow-developing conflict is resolved.
A single court of tax appeals, which, unlike the present appellate courts,
also reviewed appeals from the Court of Claims, would have a manageable
annual load of about 442 cases, 340 of which would be decided after hearing
or submission. No doubt a significant number of these would be disposed of
without full opinion. And no account is being taken of probable diminution
in appeals due to the issue involved already having been decided.
In the trial courts, the typical non-conflict case required a month longer
for decision than did the typical conflict case. Again, no evidence is available
from which one can accurately determine the incidence of litigation due to co-
ordinate courts of appeals. As at the appellate level, it is undoubtedly sub-
183. The cases decided by the memorandum opinions are being disregarded in
discussing the Supreme Court.
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stantial. The evidence, however, clearly shows an element of social waste when
the Tax Court differs with controlling decisions of the courts of appeals. It
also demonstrates an increase in the Supreme Court load due to decisions of
the Court of Claims conflicting with those of the circuit courts.
From the tax year to ultimate disposition by the Supreme Court, the
typical case reviewed by the Court because of conflict took longer than the
typical non-conflict case by one year, one month and 26 days. The great bulk
of this difference, one year and six days, is attributable to the period before
suit was begun in the trial courts. Again, available data will not reveal with
precision whether this time difference is due to lack of final, settled rules at
the appellate level. One can hardly doubt, however, that administrative nego-
tiations will consume more time than otherwise where the existing authorities
support both sides, 8 4 or where one side or the other hopes to upset uniform
authority. 8 5 Indeed, the Treasury Department has a special interest in the
latter course because of the broad impact an adverse decision has upon the
revenue.' 88
Moreover, the earlier study of Remmlein also supports the conclusion
that cases ultimately reviewed for conflict are more troublesome at the ad-
ministrative level. Nor is there much doubt that the availability of multiple
appellate forums engenders assessments, contests, and generally increases
administrative and taxpayer activity. The only real question is, how much?,
and here again, evidence is lacking. From the number of conflicting courts of
appeals decisions on issues involved in slow-developing conflicts, it must be
substantial.
During the five terms beginning October 1955, the Supreme Court resolved
22 conflicts which developed over a period from 30 days to 29 years, three
months and 26 days, and were resolved in from one year to 30 years, one
month and 22 days. Eight of the conflicts required more than 10 years to
develop, five of these taking over 15 years. These conflicts took additional time
of from 10 months to almost three years to resolve. Seven of the conflicts
developed within 1.2 years and were resolved in additional periods of from
184. E.g., as in United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304 (1960); New Hampshire Fire
Ins. Co. v. Scanlon, 362 U.S. 404 (1959); Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 356
U.S. (1958); Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958). In the Fidelity-Philadelphia
case, the government bucked Bohnen v. Harrison, 199 F.2d 492 (1953) which had been
affirmed for the taxpayer by an equally divided Supreme Court, 345 U.S. 946 (1953).
185. The taxpayer was faced with uniform authority against him in e.g., Com-
missioner v. Gillette Motor Transport Inc., 364 U.S. 130 (1959); Squire v. Capoeman,
351 U.S. 1 (1956); United States v. Anderson Clayton & Co., 350 U.S. 55 (1955). In the
last case, the taxpayer won in the Supreme Court over a long line of circuit court
decisions uniformly holding for the Government.
186. The government was faced with uniform authority on the side of the taxpayer
in e.g., Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960); Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States,
364 U.S. 92 (1960); Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82 (1956); National Lead Co. v.
Commissioner, 352 U.S. 313 (1957); Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350
U.S. 46 (1955); Millinery Center Building Corp. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 456 (1956);
Hansen v. Commissioner, 360 U.S. 446 (1959); Haynes v. United States, 353 U.S. 81
(1957).
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7-1/2 months to 2-1/2 years. The median conflict-developing period was four
years, one month and 24 days. The median conflict-resolving period was five
years and four months.
The length of the conflict-developing period does not appear to depend
upon the intricacy of the issue involved or upon the proportion of taxpayers
affected. Both slow and rapid-developing conflicts involved comparatively
simple issues and ones of considerable difficulty or with relatively narrow im-
pact. The slow-developing conflicts, in the main, involved relatively simple
issues, affecting a wide range of taxpayers, settled answers to which are crucial
to tax planning, self-assessment and fair, efficient administration of revenue
laws. These issues caused considerable litigation in the courts of appeals, and
necessarily below that level, before they were finally settled by the Supreme
Court. That they should unnecessarily remain unsettled for from 10 to 30 years
seems unthinkable. In view of the excessive litigation engendered and the
uneven justice received by the taxpayer, to allow them to remain open for
even the median time of over five years is at least seriously debatable.
The removal of civil tax appeals from the jurisdiction of the circuit courts
of appeals, and from the Supreme Court in the case of the appeals from the
Court of Claims, would appear to have only a beneficial effect in terms of the
work loads of the courts involved. As already seen, the Supreme Court load
of cases decided by opinion would be reduced by five percent. The circuit
courts of appeals, many of which are presently overburdened, would have
their caseload reduced by 11.5 percent. And a single court of appeals would
have a manageable annual load of about 442 cases, approximately 340 of
which would require hearing or submission before disposition. The number of
cases which would require an opinion would no doubt be less. And this takes
no account of a very probable reduction in appeals because of elimination of
multiple appellate forums.
Appellate review of civil tax cases by eleven co-ordinate courts has serious
undesirable effects upon the processes of judicial review, upon justice to the
individual taxpayers, and especially upon the fair and efficient administration
of revenue laws. It is time to concentrate such review in a single court of tax
appeals.
